

# **Vulnerability Research**


NON EXAMINABLE CONTENT

## **Tutorial questions**

- How are you guys enjoying the ban counter?
- hehexd

#### **Overview**

- What is vuln research
- How to find things
  - General methodology
- How do I report



#### **Note on ethics**

- Everything here is **uncharted territory**
- If you actually find things, they are undisclosed.
- In big open source programs, disclosure is usually okay
- But if its some closed source thing that you got a leak for.. Maybe not.

# What is vuln research

 Finding vulns in publicly running software



## How to start (promode)

- 1. Pick any open source software
- 2. Download codebase
- 3. Audit by hand.

#### How to start (with a bit of help)

- 1. Find existing/previous CVEs in open source software
  - a. Identify the code patterns
  - b. E.g. call\_user\_func\_array(\$some\_user\_controlled\_parameter);
- 2. Find code patterns left in present versions of the software
- 3. Find an appropriate sink
- 4. Find an appropriate input
- 5. Publish and get your name on some CVE

### How to report

- Email the CVE mailing list
- You get a CWE use this while working with the vendor to patch
- CVE donezo

#### **Practical Examples**

- Drupalgeddon 1
- <a href="https://www.sektioneins.de/en/advisories/advisory-012014-drupal-pre-auth-sql-injection-vulner-ability.html">https://www.sektioneins.de/en/advisories/advisory-012014-drupal-pre-auth-sql-injection-vulner-ability.html</a>

• https://www.sektioneins.de//en/blog/14-11-03-drupal-sql-injection-vulnerability-PoC.html

# Where is our sink

```
// If the placeholder value to insert is an array, assume that we need
// to expand it out into a comma-delimited set of placeholders.
foreach (array_filter($args, 'is_array') as $key ⇒ $data) {
  $new_keys = array();
 foreach ($data as $i ⇒ $value) {
   // This assumes that there are no other placeholders that use the same
   // name. For example, if the array placeholder is defined as :example
   // and there is already an :example 2 placeholder, this will generate
   // a duplicate key. We do not account for that as the calling code
   // is already broken if that happens.
    $new_keys[$key . '_' . $i] = $value;
 // Update the query with the new placeholders.
 // preg replace is necessary to ensure the replacement does not affect
 // placeholders that start with the same exact text. For example, if the
 // query contains the placeholders :foo and :foobar, and :foo has an
 // array of values, using str_replace would affect both placeholders,
 // but using the following preg replace would only affect :foo because
 // it is followed by a non-word character.
  $query = preg replace('#' . $key . '\b#', implode(', ', array_keys($new_keys)), $query);
 // Update the args array with the new placeholders.
 unset($args[$key]);
  $modified = TRUE;
return $modified;
```

protected function expandArguments(&\$query, &\$args) {

\$modified = FALSE;

# How do we get there

```
public function query($query, array $args = array(), $options = array()) {
 // Use default values if not already set.
  $options += $this→defaultOptions();
 try {
   // We allow either a pre-bound statement object or a literal string.
   // In either case, we want to end up with an executed statement object,
    // which we pass to PDOStatement::execute.
    if ($query instanceof DatabaseStatementInterface) {
      $stmt = $query;
     $stmt→execute(NULL, $options);
    else {
      $this→expandArguments($query, $args);
      $stmt = $this→prepareQuery($query);
      $stmt→execute($args, $options);
```

# How do we get there

```
function _drupal_session_read($sid) {
 global $user, $is https;
 // Write and Close handlers are called after destructing objects
 // since PHP 5.0.5.
 // Thus destructors can use sessions but session handler can't use objects.
 // So we are moving session closure before destructing objects.
 drupal register shutdown function('session write close');
 // Handle the case of first time visitors and clients that don't store
 // cookies (eg. web crawlers).
  $insecure_session_name = substr(session_name(), 1);
  if (!isset($ COOKIE[session name()]) & !isset($ COOKIE[$insecure session name])) {
    $user = drupal_anonymous_user();
    return '';
 // Otherwise, if the session is still active, we have a record of the
 // client's session in the database. If it's HTTPS then we are either have
 // a HTTPS session or we are about to log in so we check the sessions table
 // for an anonymous session with the non-HTTPS-only cookie.
 if ($is_https) {
    $user = db query("SELECT u.*, s.* FROM {users} u INNER JOIN {sessions} s ON u.uid = s.uid WHERE s
    if (!$user) {
      if (isset($ COOKIE[$insecure session name])) {
       $user = db_query("SELECT u.*, s.* FROM {users} u INNER JOIN {sessions} s ON u.uid = s.uid WHEI
        ':sid' ⇒ $_COOKIE[$insecure_session_name]))
        →fetchObject();
```

#### Next example: Drupalgeddon2

• They released a notice saying developers please critically patch

#### Drupal 7 and 8 core critical release on April 25th, 2018 PSA-2018-003

Posted by Drupal Security Team on 23 Apr 2018 at 16:27 UTC

There will be a security release of **Drupal 7.x**, **8.4.x**, **and 8.5.x on April 25th, 2018 between 16:00 – 18:00 UTC**. This PSA is to notify that the Drupal core release is outside of the regular schedule of security releases. For all security updates, the Drupal Security Team urges you to reserve time for core updates at that time because there is some risk that exploits might be developed within hours or days. Security release announcements will appear on the Drupal.org security advisory page.

This security release is a follow-up to the one released as SA-CORE-2018-002 on March 28.

• Sites on 7.x or 8.5.x can immediately update when the advisory is released using the normal



So we waited for the vulnerability release.

```
if (!$sanitized) {
    // Ensure the whitelist array exists.
    $conf['sanitize input whitelist'] = array();
    $sanitized keys = drupal bootstrap sanitize input($ GET, $conf['sanitize input whitelist']);
    $sanitized keys = array merge($sanitized keys, drupal bootstrap sanitize input($ POST, $conf['sanitize input whitelist']));
    $sanitized keys = array merge($sanitized keys, drupal bootstrap sanitize input($ REQUEST, $conf['sanitize input whitelist']));
    $sanitized keys = array merge($sanitized keys, drupal bootstrap sanitize input($ COOKIE, $conf['sanitize input whitelist']));
    $sanitized keys = array unique($sanitized keys);
    if (count($sanitized keys) && !empty($conf['sanitize input logging'])) {
      trigger error(check plain(sprintf('Potentially unsafe keys removed from request parameters: %s', implode(', ', $sanitized keys)), E USER WARNING));
    $sanitized = TRUE;
+}
+/**
+ * Sanitizes unsafe keys from user input.
+ * @param mixed $input
     Input to sanitize.
+ * @param array $whitelist
+ * Whitelist of values.
+ * @return array
+ */
+function drupal bootstrap sanitize input(&$input, $whitelist = array()) {
+ $sanitized keys = array();
  if (is array($input)) {
    foreach ($input as $key => $value) {
      if ($key !== '' && $key[0] === '#' && !in array($key, $whitelist, TRUE)) {
        unset($input[$key]);
        $sanitized keys[] = $key;
      elseif (is array($input[$key])) {
        $sanitized keys = array merge($sanitized keys, drupal bootstrap sanitize input($input[$key], $whitelist));
+
```

Get the Patch

# Find the vuln?

## Uncovering Drupalgeddon 2

April 12, 2018


By Eyal Shalev, Rotem Reiss and Eran Vaknin

#### **Abstract**

Two weeks ago, a highly critical (25/25 NIST rank) vulnerability, nicknamed Drupalgeddon 2 (SA-CORE-2018-002 / CVE-2018-7600), was disclosed by the Drupal security team. This vulnerability allowed an unauthenticated attacker to perform remote code execution on default or common Drupal installations.

#### Finding the vuln

- The patch removes things from arrays
- So go through places where arrays are dangerously used
  - o (or just browse twitter)
- People like this taunting.



#### Little shits like this

- Post github repos.
- That are empty so they can get a few retweets





#### Drupal cve-2018-7600 PoC by @riyazwalikar



#### Remote Code Execution with Drupal core (SA-CORE-2018-002)

This post attempts to delve into the Highly Critical vulnerability that was announced by Drupal on 28th March 7:14 PM UTC tagged as...

blog.appsecco.com

5:34 AM - 30 Mar 2018

#### **But do this**

Make memes.





I get back from a long weekend away and there's \*still\* no Drupal PoC exploit?! What gives?



1:42 AM - 3 Apr 2018

7 Retweets 44 Likes














# Its funny, when you're not the person we're laughing at.

## The bug

	Key	Value
~	form_id	user_register_form
~	mail[#foo]	bar
~	mail[#baz]	foo



```
public static function uploadAjaxCallback(&$form, FormStateInterface &$form state, Request
 /** @var \Drupal\Core\Render\RendererInterface $renderer */
  $renderer = \Drupal::service( id: 'renderer');
 $form parents = explode( delimiter: '/', $request->query->get( key: 'element parents'));
  // Retrieve the element to be rendered.
 $form = NestedArray::getValue($form, $form parents);
  // Add the special AJAX class if a new file was added.
  $current file count = $form state->get('file upload delta initial');
  if (isset($form['#file upload delta']) && $current file count < $form['#file upload delta']
    $form[$current file count]['#attributes']['class'][] = 'ajax-new-content';
  // Otherwise just add the new content class on a placeholder.
 else {
    $form['#suffix'] .= '<span class="ajax-new-content"></span>';
  $status messages = ['#type' => 'status messages'];
  $form['#prefix'] .= $renderer->renderRoot($status messages);
 $output = $renderer->renderRoot($form);
```

#### Here we go

### Finally.

```
// Filter the outputted content and make any last changes before the content
// is sent to the browser. The changes are made on $content which allows the
// outputted text to be filtered.
if (isset($elements['#post_render'])) {
  foreach ($elements['#post_render'] as $callable) {
    if (is_string($callable) && strpos($callable, '::') == FALSE) {
        $callable = $this -> controllerResolver -> getControllerFromDefinition($callable);
    }
    $elements['#children'] = call_user_func($callable, $elements['#children'], $elements);
}
}
```

#### Ok what the actual fuck

- How do i find this shit.
- How do i figure out where the sink is
- Where does this input come from

# Fuckin grep lol

## Literally grep

#### cont...


- https://research.checkpoint.com/uncovering-drupalgeddon-2/
- https://gist.github.com/AlbinoDrought/626c07ee96bae21cb174003c9c710384

### **Next Example: Github**

http://blog.orange.tw/2017/01/bug-bounty-github-enterprise-sql-injection.html

#### S1: download github





To direct input to this VM, click inside or press Ctrl+G.






445



```
# ls -al /data/
total 92
drwxr-xr-x 23 root.
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 .
                               root.
drwxr-xr-x 27 root
                                                 4096 Dec 28 19:18 ..
                               root
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 alambic
drwxr-xr-x 4 babeld
                               babeld
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:53 babeld
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 codeload
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                               root
                                                4096 Nov 29 12:54 db
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                               root
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:52 enterprise
drwxr-xr-x 4 enterprise-manage enterprise-manage 4096 Nov 29 12:53 enterprise-manage
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 failbotd
drwxr-xr-x 3 root
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 git-hooks
                               root
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:53 github
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 git-import
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 gitmon
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 gpgverify
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 hookshot
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 lariat
drwxr-xr-x 4 root
                               root
drwxr-xr-x 4 root
                               root
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 longpoll
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 mail-replies
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 pages
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 pages-lua
drwxr-xr-x 4 root.
                               root
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 render
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root.
                                                   23 Nov 29 12:52 repositories ->
                               root
/data/user/repositories
drwxr-xr-x 4 git
                               git
                                                 4096 Nov 29 12:54 slumlord
drwxr-xr-x 20 root
                                                 4096 Dec 28 19:22 user
                               root
```



About 429 results (0.42 seconds)

#### ruby revealer.sh · GitHub

https://gist.github.com/geoff-codes/02d1e45912253e9ac183 ▼
#//usr/bin/sudo sh. ## ruby\_revealer.sh -- decrypt obfuscated GHE .rb files. 2.0.0 to 2.3.1+. ## From
`strings ruby\_concealer.so`:. ##. ## > This obfuscation is ...

#### ghe-revealer.rb · GitHub

https://gist.github.com/iscgar/e8ea7560c9582e4615fcc439177e22b7 ▼
revealer.rb -- Deobfuscate GHE .rb files. #. # This is simple: # Every obfuscated file in the GHE VM
contains the following code: #. # > require "ruby\_concealer.so ...

#### How does ruby\_concealer.so work! · Issue #694 · holman/ama · GitHub https://github.com/holman/ama/issues/694 •

Jun 15, 2015 - GitHub is where people build software. More than 27 million people use GitHub to discover, fork, and contribute to over 80 million projects.

#### GitHub Enterprise Remote Code Execution - exablue

https://www.exablue.de/.../2017-03-15-github-enterprise-remote-code-execution.html 
Mar 14, 2017 - Turns out that there is a ruby module named ruby\_concealer.so that just runs Zlib ::Inflate::inflate on the binary string and then and XORs with ...

#### Economy of mechanism – The road to your codebase is paved with ... www.economyofmechanism.com/github-saml •

decrypted\_source/\*+ARGV[0] if content.include? "ruby\_concealer.so" content.sub! %Q(require "ruby\_concealer.so"\n\_ruby\_concealer.so, " decrypt " plaintext ...

#### Github enterprise remote code execution vulnerability analysis ...

https://vulners.com/myhack58/MYHACK58:62201784400 ▼

Mar 17, 2017 - If you have a lot of Green Paper or for your own code very paranoid, then ... is a named **ruby\_concealer. so** the ruby module, the binary string is ...



glhf.read the writeup

#### tldr

- Find software
- Obtain "open source" software (even its enterprise)
- Find vulns
  - Identify code patterns
  - Find previous CVEs
- Re apply them. Grep 2win
- Find an input
  - Collect \$\$

#### Kk thats it.

Read the rest yourselves

http://blog.orange.tw/2017/01/bug-bounty-github-enterprise-sql-injection.html

http://blog.orange.tw/2017/07/how-i-chained-4-vulnerabilities-on.html

https://www.exablue.de/blog/2017-03-15-github-enterprise-remote-code-execution.html

https://www.flickr.com/photos/hivint/